US interest in Asia: Business, not war

By TONY LOPEZ

The Philippines and the US are close allies.  That’s the theory.  The Philippines is the only and oldest defense and treaty ally of the US in Asia.   

Under the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951, an attack on one is an attack on the other.  If you attack the Philippines, it is like attacking the US itself and the latter will respond correspondingly, in accordance with its constitutional processes.   Under Donald Trump, that defense guarantee was upgraded to “ironclad”. 

In 2022, then Vice President Kamala Harris told President Marcos Jr. that “an armed attack on the Philippines armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the South China Sea would invoke US Mutual Defense commitments.”

Assert naval presence in the South China Sea

In September 2024, US Secretary of defense Lloyd Austin III reaffirmed America’s “ironclad” commitment to defending the Philippines after China’s latest effort to assert its naval presence in the South China Sea.

On Oct. 30, 2025 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth  met with Defense Secretary Teodoro.  They announced the creation of “Task Force Philippines” — a joint initiative aimed at improving US-Philippines cooperation and interoperability.  

Decisive response to aggression

Accordingly, the US Pacific Fleet announced that the task force would increase preparedness for contingencies so that “we can decisively respond to crisis or aggression and reestablish deterrence in the South China Sea,” said Hegseth.  He also assured the US  would not introduce new US combat forces, conduct offensive operations, or result in permanent military basing in the Philippines. The US has nine EDCA (or bases) sites in our country.

An Inquirer editorial of Dec. 18, 2025 sneered at so-called “ironclad” defense commitments of the US.  It cited a December 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) published by the White House which seems to undercut sweet “ironclad” talk.  Donald Trump’s 33-page paper does not mention Manila at all. 

US sees its global interest narrower than before

The NSS, frets the New York Times,  “describes a world in which American interests are far narrower than how prior administrations — even in Mr. Trump’s first term — had portrayed them. Gone is the long-familiar picture of the United States as a global force for freedom, replaced by a country that is focused on reducing migration while avoiding passing judgment on authoritarians, instead seeing them as sources of cash.”

Says the NYT: “China is cast as a competitor, but mainly in the familiar commercial terms often repeated by Mr. Trump. The document says a war over Taiwan needs to be deterred because of what would be its ‘major implications for the US economy’. It calls for ‘a genuinely mutually advantageous economic relationship with Beijing’, echoing the conciliation of the trade truce that Mr. Trump and Xi Jinping, the Chinese leader, announced in October.” 

US will hesitate to go to war

Today, the US won’t just go to any war, for any reason.  Before waging any war, America must first use diplomacy and economic leverage.

“A world on fire, where wars come to our shores, is bad for American interests. President Trump uses unconventional diplomacy, America’s military might, and economic leverage to surgically extinguish embers of division between nuclear-capable nations and violent wars caused by centuries-long hatred,” says the NSS. 

On burden-sharing and burden-shifting, the NSS says:  “The days of the US propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over. We count among our many allies and partners dozens of wealthy, sophisticated nations that must assume primary responsibility for their regions and contribute far more to our collective defense.”

NATO must up defense spending

The 32 NATO countries must now spend for their own defense, by raising their defense spending to 5% of GDP.  The US will help, but only if it can do business, but not to buy guns for the use of allies.

“The United States will stand ready to help—potentially through more favorable treatment on commercial matters, technology sharing, and defense procurement—those counties that willingly take more responsibility for security in their neighborhoods and align their export controls with ours,” says the NSS.

Peace is Trump’s priority, not war.  His concept of war is not about weapons, but economic warfare.

Peace deals, not war efforts

“Seeking peace deals at the President’s direction, even in regions and countries peripheral to our immediate core interests, is an effective way to increase stability, strengthen America’s global influence, realign countries and regions toward our interests, and open new markets,” says the NSS.

Going forward, relates the NSS, “we will rebalance America’s economic relationship with China, prioritizing reciprocity and fairness to restore American economic independence. Trade with China should be balanced and focused on non-sensitive factors.” 

“If America remains on a growth path—and can sustain that while maintaining a genuinely mutually advantageous economic relationship with Beijing—we should be headed from our present $30 trillion economy in 2025 to $40 trillion in the 2030s, putting our country in an enviable position to maintain our status as the world’s leading economy. Our ultimate goal is to lay the foundation for long-term economic vitality.”

US allies have $35 trillion economic power

Adds the NSS, “the US must work with our treaty allies and partners—who together add another $35 trillion in economic power to our own $30 trillion national economy (together constituting more than half the world economy)—to counteract predatory economic practices and use our combined economic power to help safeguard our prime position in the world economy and ensure that allied economies do not become subordinate to any competing power. 

 “We must continue to improve commercial (and other) relations with India to encourage New Delhi to contribute to Indo-Pacific security, including through continued quadrilateral cooperation with Australia, Japan, and the United States (“the Quad”). 

 “Moreover, we will also work to align the actions of our allies and partners with our joint interest in preventing domination by any single competitor nation.”

 Meanwhile, the US Senate has approved a $2.5-billion security assistance to the Philippines.  Trump will sign the bill into law. 

The bipartisan Philippines Enhanced Resilience Act (PERA Act), extends $500 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grant to Manila from 2026 to 2030, or $2.5 billion over five years.

An unreliable ally?

In a recent editorial, The Economist described the US now as an unreliable ally, in the light of its Dec. 4, 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS), which the magazine says, should give policymakers in allied countries reasons to panic:

“First, because America’s foreign policy, although still contested, seems more likely to move in a worse direction than a better one; and second, because the erratic way in which policy is made means that allies cannot depend on anything that they are told, even by President Donald Trump himself and certainly not by his squabbling courtiers.”

Mass migration the greatest threat?

The Economist says the NSS, “declares the West’s greatest threat to be ‘mass migration’. To prevent it, the document pledges not just to secure America’s own borders, but also to support populist-right parties in Europe which promise to secure borders there. It fails to mention even the possibility that Russia might be a threat.”

Nuanced Asian picture

On Asia, The Economist says, “the picture is more nuanced. The document is much less clear about the threat posed by China than the first Trump administration’s NSS, in 2017.

“Official thinking today seems to be guided by commerce and a desire to preserve a planned April summit between Mr. Trump and Xi Jinping, China’s leader. News that America will allow Nvidia to sell one of its more advanced chips in China suggests that the administration is ready to sacrifice some of its technological edge over China in exchange for goodwill, however fleeting.

“Fortunately, the NSS renews America’s commitment to deterring attacks on Taiwan, which some had feared was wavering. And yet who can be sure what that reassurance is worth?”

Is there hope?

The Economist sees one. It writes:

“The intelligence agencies and top military brass are likely to resist or slow down changes they see as rash or unwise.

“The strategy’s slapdash drafting suggests that, unusually for an NSS, it is not the settled view of the administration.”